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1. Opening 
Where does philosophy stand now? It is a question that has always been asked. 
Indeed, it’s possible to read the history of philosophy as a series of stands that have 
already been taken; stands that delimit and are delimited by a sense of the now.1 What 
of philosophy now? The question intends to underscore the presence of a relation 
between the philosophical and the now. What occurs takes place in this now, as a now 
demanding to be thought. In broader terms, this is to argue that philosophy is 
positioned by its own predicament, the predicament in which it finds itself. While the 
only way of addressing the question necessitates making a claim about the elements 
within the relation between philosophy and the now, a preliminary note needs to be 
added concerning how this particular instance of relationality is to be understood. It is 
not as though any understanding of the now of writing, the now within which 
philosophy is written, need have an impact on the philosophical. It might be the case 
that philosophy remain indifferent to the now in which it is occurring such that this 
now remains unthought philosophically. Philosophy’s indifference would try to 
construct a philosophical justification, one that might seek to ally the philosophical 
with the scientific or quantitative method and, as such, remain oblivious to the way 
the culture that surrounds it was manifest. Indifference to the now, a philosophical 
indifference, yields a conception of the philosophical that in holding itself apart from 
the now fails to think the now as a philosophical topos and thus refuses to confront the 
possibility of thought having its own proper predicament.2 In other words, one answer 
to the question noted at the outset—Where does philosophy stand now?—would be to 
refuse the possibility of a relation between philosophy and the now (the now as a 
philosopheme). If this possibility—which is real and which has allowed philosophy to 
become apathetic—was no longer possible and, as a result, philosophy does take a 
stand, and thus allows the question of its own stand in relation to the now to have 
delimited a specific philosophical project, then what has to be addressed is the 
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specificity or the particularity of this now, this now insistent now of writing. Insisting 
on the now, and thus allowing it to insist, works to redefine the philosophical, since 
then now would then have been stripped of its self-evidence.  This move signals both 
the departure from empiricism, in which the now is taken to be self-evident, and from 
naturalism, in which the now is taken to have a recalcitrant inevitability. 
The contention here is that what determines or defines this now is the 
ineliminable presence of catastrophic climate change, a change that is leaving the 
world in ruins. Part of what allows climate change to be understood as catastrophic 
has to do with the possible impossibility of what are described in the IPCC’s 2014 
Synthesis Report as “effective adaptation and mitigation responses” to be effective. 
The report argues that the responses and thus the eventual or even possible diminution 
of the results of climate change  
 
would depend on policies and measures across multiple scales: international, 
regional, national and sub-national. Policies across all scales supporting 
technological development, diffusion and transfer, as well as finance for 
responses to climate change, can complement and enhance the effectiveness of 
policies that directly promote adaptation and mitigation.3  
 
Even if this assessment were only partially accurate—and there is no reason to 
doubt that it is anything other than completely accurate—what it identifies is a set of 
conditions that the current economic orders and their commitment to continual growth 
cannot fulfill. The problem is, however, more complex than it first appears. A 
doubling occurs. Growth sustains the continual recreation of inequality while 
simultaneously sustaining the exponential increase in the impact of climate change. 
And the difficulty continues: if unsustainable growth is linked to climate change, then 
the drivers of growth are no longer under the control of the political in any direct 
sense. The separation of the political and the economic through the continual 
deregulation of the banking sector and the use of the three credit ratings agencies 
(Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and the Fitch Group) to effectively limit the percentage 
of Social Democratic welfare spending as a percentage of GDP has created a setup in 
which a political response to the causes of climate change, which involve an uncritical 
reiteration of models of economic growth that reciprocally sustain inequality both 
nationally and internationally, appears to have become impossible. As a result, 
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inequality, in the name of a specific politics, has been naturalized. What this means, 
of course, is that sustaining inequality cannot be separated from maintaining that 
interconnection between the economic and the political that is inextricably bound up 
with climate change.4 The commitment to inequality cannot be separated from 
arguments indicating the inevitability of catastrophic climate change. While this 
reframes arguments for justice, it opens up, at the same time, the need to engage 
another possibility.  
However, prior to that engagement it is essential to be clear concerning the 
nature of the connection between injustice and climate change. Maintaining a world in 
which injustice predominates entails opening that world to its own destruction as a 
result of the link between injustice and climate change. The severance of that link, 
were it to be possible, would involve a transformation of the world such that it would 
no longer be a locus of injustice.  That transformation would be a countermeasure in 
which the world is both retained and reconfigured. And yet, it is still possible to 
understand the presence of the countermeasure as a form of catastrophe. In this 
specific instance, the catastrophe is the undoing of injustice and thus the creation of 
another world. This would be the catastrophe that is necessary were it possible to 
forestall catastrophic climate change. The latter is a form of catastrophe in which 
there is an ending without either transformation or continuity. The advent of the 
latter—the presence now of catastrophic climate change—is what is new. It is what is 
occurring now. Philosophy, were it to be delimited by this now, would be constrained 
to think this double sense of the catastrophic and thus to think the end of the world. 
(What emerges is the possibility of the end of the world that is not axiomatically 
connected to what Heidegger identifies as another beginning.5 As a result, a different 
sense of danger would obtain.)  
The project of this paper is to begin to respond to the question of the 
catastrophic via an engagement with the philosophical writings of Heidegger, 
specifically in terms of the presentation of “world” and “earth” in “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” with a painting by Nicholas Poussin—Landscape with St. John on 
Patmos (1640)—as well as a recent multimedia installation by Anselm Kiefer, 
Walhalla (2016).6 However, as noted above, there is the need to engage the possibility 
that the first catastrophe, namely, the severance of the link between injustice and 
climate change, cannot be brought about. In other words, ending injustice and 
therefore maintaining the world hovers at the edge of the impossible. The link 
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between injustice and catastrophic climate change is maintained, and thus philosophy 
has to think the end of the world in which the end is present neither as transformation 
nor as a discontinuity within continuity. The end to be thought is the end of the world 
as such, that is, a world that is now present without always already bearing within it 
the inscription, image, or possibility of another beginning. While this, as an 
eventuality, may seem extreme, the contention here is that it is not. Indeed, the 
contrary is the case. It is the risk that is now apparent.7 It is simply the other genuine 
possibility, once the link between maintained injustice and climate change can be 
substantiated.  
One approach to thinking the end of the world in which that end is present as a 
philosophical topos is to think it in terms of death and thus to link the end of the 
world to a form of death. Philosophy has always maintained an important relation to 
death. Plato, in the Phaedo, connects philosophy to the preparation for death. Hence 
the important formulation: “The one aim of those who practice philosophy correctly 
[ὀρθῶς] is to practice for dying and death.” (64a3–4)8 However, what death means 
here is not the end of the world, but the end of the world of a particular individual. 
Importantly, it should be noted that even then it is not the individual as a whole and 
thus as a totality who dies, since “death is the separation of the soul from the body” 
(64c5–6). Hence, rather than a preparation for the end of the world, Socrates’ concern 
is with the death of the individual. The soul’s continuity can be imagined. If Plato 
provides an opening in which the recognition of the world’s end might be explicated 
in terms of a preparation for a good death, it still remains a conception of death in 
which it is only the individual’s body that dies. The soul lives on. Thus death becomes 
a form of survival. (Even the act of mourning is a possible form of survival: the 
afterlife as the work of mourning is thus still a life. There is still life.) What has to be 
taken up is what survival would mean when what is at stake is the end of the world as 
such. Does it make sense to hold on to a form of afterlife?  
The challenge, however, is real. Catastrophic climate change demands that 
which is radically other to any simple evocation of mere survival. It demands both 
that the end of the world be thought and that the human—whether in terms of the 
friend or a more generalized sense of alterity—no longer structure thought on its own. 
Where worldliness is no longer delimited by human being, understood as an end in 
itself, nor in the simple evocation of the self/other relation, it has to be reconfigured in 
terms of a more complex modality of relation—the latter involving an always already 
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present relation to place. As a result, this would be the point at which being-in-place 
would need to be thought as always already—hence anoriginally—interarticulated 
with being-in-common.9 Place would gain ascendancy over human being if the latter 
were identified with the purely human. Were Plato adaptable to this project, then 
human being’s predicament, given the now in which it occurs and thus takes a stand, 
is to prepare for death properly. Now, however, it is death as the end of the world. 
This demand is one that stems from the recognition that not only is a philosophical 
anthropology always delimited by place, but that what is now at issue is both the 
possibility and the actuality of place as such. The questions are clear: What would a 
preparation for the end of the world be like? What needs to be taught and understood 
such that it became possible to argue that human being was prepared for the end of 
the world?10  
The question of preparation is itself complex. Preparation is informed by a 
sense of possibility and thus of a form of openness. And yet, more is involved since 
understanding what preparation means can be provided by noting its initial link to a 
form of resignation. To be prepared may mean having become resigned to death and 
thus by extension resigned to the end of the world. Equally, however, to be prepared 
may lead in another direction. If there is another path then what has to be thought 
through is the presence of preparation without mere resignation. At this stage, these 
differing possibilities can only continue as questions; and as questions the viability of 
their formulation and thus what they seek to elicit are all far from certain. Rather than 
respond to questions of preparation and possibility directly, it is essential to continue 
by allowing them to be located within the way in which fundamental moments within 
the history of philosophy and the history of art have engaged with what can be more 
generally described as the complex connection between continuity and discontinuity.  
If there is a constellation around which this occurs, then it is sustained here by the 
figure of the ruin.11 A certain sense of the discontinuous can be understood as 
exemplifying the structure of the catastrophe in that the possibility of a future is based 
on the ruining of what preceded it. Continuity and discontinuity as they are thought 
now pertain to the world. Not the world that is set over against the subject, but rather 
human being as already worldly and thus as already placed—human being as being-
in-place. This is the opening to Heidegger on the world. What makes Heidegger’s 
engagement with the world important is not just the specific ways in which the 
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relation between what he designates as “earth” and “world” is to be thought, but the 
way the argument is advanced in terms of an engagement with works of art.12  
  
2. Heidegger: Earth, World and “Templework” 
Now, what does thinking the world entail? The answer is thinking the end of the 
world, which equals the recognition that the work of art, rather than holding open a 
world, announces the world’s impossibility. If this is right, then what this brings with 
it is the need to think the end of the world as an ending without a beginning. In 
section 31 of Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger offers a detailed investigation 
of endings and beginnings. Rather than a concern with philosophy’s history as 
articulated in terms of simple continuity, Heidegger’s project is not just with 
beginnings and endings, rather, and more significantly, it is with the structure of the 
decision that pertains to them. There are two senses of beginning and end in the 
presentation of Heidegger’s position. The first sense of “end” is articulated in the 
following terms:   
 
The greatness of the end consists not only in the essentiality of the closure of 
the great possibilities but also in the power to prepare a transition to something 
wholly other [der Kraft zur Vorbereitung des Überganges zu einem ganz 
Anderen].13 
 
In regard to the second sense of “end,” neither critique nor “destruction” pertains in 
any direct sense. Moreover, ends and beginning are not identified with the practice of 
invention. Heidegger’s formulation in this regard is precise. 
 
At the same time [zugleich], however, “end” refers to the running out and the 
dissipation [das Auslaufen und Sichverlaufen] of all the effects of the previous 
history of Western thinking. That is, it refers to a confusion of the traditional 
basic positions, value concepts and propositions in the usual interpretation of 
beings [des Seienden].14 
 
In order to understand this twofold sense of ending, it is essential to note 
Heidegger’s actual expression. He writes of “running out” and “dissipation.” Both of 
these formulations can be connected to forms of exhaustion. A logic of exhaustion is 
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inextricably bound up with the interconnection of closure and preparation. The 
relation between an “end” and “the other beginning” has, for Heidegger, the form of a 
decision. Thus, there would be both the end and the overcoming of exhaustion. The 
decision would have been made. “We” stand before it. And Heidegger’s use of “we” 
is central. This section of the text begins: “Unser stand.” The opening line is 
emphatic. Heidegger asserts that “we” take a stand before “another beginning” (dem 
anderen Anfang). The “decision” (Entscheidung) concerns a relation to the future, a 
relation that is situated in what is described by Heidegger as “our preparedness and 
unpreparedness for the future.”15 Again, Heidegger’s use of “our” (unserer) and its 
link to the future, a link in which one is defined in terms of the other, needs to be 
noted. It is indeed “our” “future.” In this domain, positioned in relation to this future, 
“we” find ourselves. This is a finding in which “we” return to “our” proper selves. 
Both the finding and returning occur in relation to “what happens authentically.” The 
formulation connects happening to being historical. In this return an important 
distinction is established. The distinction is between that which is irrelevant to 
history, irrelevant even though occupying a place in the past, and that which is 
genuinely historical. In the same section of the text, Heidegger will argue that 
“historiography is a narcotic averting us from history.”16 While the question of the 
genuinely historical should not, however, be generalized too quickly, the nature of the 
distinction that it establishes still needs to be granted its effective force.  
For Heidegger, the setting in which the decision occurs has a particular 
determination. Elements of the formulation have already been cited above. 
Nonetheless, the full character of the decision should be identified. Heidegger writes 
that this  
 
domain is opened up—if it does indeed unfurl—according to the originality 
enabling us to find ourselves again in what genuinely occurs, out of lostness in 
our contrivances and endeavours, out of entanglement in what is obvious and 
worn out. But we will find ourselves there only through a conscious awareness 
of the beginning and of what was given to it.17 
 
The response to this formulation in which a certain logic of the gift remains operative, 
the response to Heidegger that is determined by the sense of the catastrophic that 
obtains now, should be clear. That clarity becomes manifest when given the form of a 
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question: What if there is no longer, now, the possibility of a beginning? In that case, 
except as an act of self-deception, there could not be “a conscious awareness of the 
beginning.” The question of the impossibility of a beginning is itself already a 
reframing of how beginnings are themselves to be understood. Answering such a 
question would necessitate a radically new conception of a beginning. Beginning now 
with the end and thus having to start with the recognition that the setting within which 
reflection were to take place would no longer be there now. At work here is the 
inscription of being-in-place as that which is threatened. The end of place would be 
the end of human being as being-in-place. To the extent that such a possibility holds, 
then what counts as an ending will also have been transformed. There is another 
world: the world at the end of the world. This world, the worlding of this world, needs 
to be pursued. It is not that the world is in danger; pure danger is there at the end of 
the world as its end. This is, of course, the sense of danger where that which saves, 
conserves, and shelters (das Rettende) is simply no longer there.18 Now danger has a 
radically different quality. Hence the philosophical question concerns the extent to 
which the emergence of pure danger, danger from which shelter is no longer already 
given, constructs the limit of Heidegger’s philosophical thinking. It would have been 
delimited by what now is the end of the world’s insistence. 
To begin, however, with the world is to begin with the project of “The Origin of 
the Work of Art.” Central to it is Heidegger’s continual thinking and rethinking of the 
world. The development it contains is the introduction into that thinking of the 
“earth.” A way needs to be found to Heidegger’s thinking of the world. In 
Mindfulness (Besinnung) Heidegger delimits a specific stance made in relation to a 
certain conception of history. What has to be either recovered or allowed is what he 
describes as “originary historicality.”  It is that “through which all history is 
overcome.”19 What is opened up here is, of course, the admission of the possibility of 
having been freed from a specific determination of the “world.” This amounts to the 
need to move from the simple evocation of history, in which historical time is equated 
with chronological time and the place of history, to the simple givenness of the world, 
to a radical reconsideration of the world as the place of historical determination as 
such. This is identified in “The Origin of the Work of Art” in terms, again, of the 
“decision.” In this regard, Heidegger writes that the 
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world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential 
decisions in the destiny of a historical people.20  
 
Of the many elements of this passage that are important, special significance, in this 
context, will be given to the formulation “essential decisions.” Determinations within 
the world, indeed the possibility of thinking worldliness itself, cannot be separated 
from the structure of the decision. And it must be immediately added that intrinsic to 
this structure is the excision of everyday decisions. The decisions in question are the 
“essential decisions.” There is a fundamental distinction at work here. The place of 
the decision is far from benign. Danger attends. It intrudes into the relationship 
between earth and world. There is a “rift.” In the argumentation of “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” the “rift” emerges by naming the relation between earth and world. 
Note the care with which the nature of the rift is presented in the attempt to identify 
what can best be described as the Auseinandersetzung between earth and world.  
 
World demands its decisiveness and its measure and lets beings attain to the 
open region of their paths. Earth, bearing and jutting, endeavors to keep itself 
closed and to entrust everything to its law. Strife is not a rift, as a mere cleft is 
ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which those in conflict belong to 
each other. This rift carries those who turn against each other in the source of 
their unity by virtue of their common ground.21 
 
Before any progress can be made with how the rift is to be understood and thus with 
what is entailed, now, by being in danger, or being pained, precision is necessary in 
terms of explicating what Heidegger means when he links conflict to a belonging 
together and then seeks to connect a conception of unity and commonality to what is 
identified as “those who turn against each other” (die Gegenwendigen). In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, as part of the discussion of the first stasimon in 
Sophocles’ Antigone, Heidegger writes of the “gegenwendigen Bezug” of dikē and 
technē.22 These two terms are in a “countervalent relation.” What is at stake in both 
instances is a mode of relationality. What marks it out is a form of coherence. Brought 
together in their unity is that which is apart. The rift identifies the divide that, in 
holding apart, brings that which is apart together. It neither unifies nor synthesizes. It 
becomes a form of appeasement, of a giving oneself over to the essential and thus to 
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being affected no longer. The demise of the aesthetic becomes another opening to the 
origin of the work of art. What is distanced, at the same time, is what might be 
described as the conventional language of philosophy, namely, the language within 
which truth understood as “the clearing and concealing of beings” is refused. The 
importance of art’s work lies in the further description of it as the “letting happen of 
the advent of the truth of beings.”23  
The radical nature of Heidegger’s thinking of “earth” and “world” lies in its 
distance from those conventions, that is, in the already present thinking of earth and 
world, and thus in its proximity to the structure of truth. This accounts for the 
difficulty of giving a quick summation of what is at stake in the difference between 
world and earth in Heidegger’s own thinking. How, then, to proceed with Heidegger 
on “earth” and “world” as they appear in “The Origin of the Work of Art”? Two 
complex passages provide the way forward. The first announces the presence of the 
temple, not as a mere literal presence and thus neither as a possible site for the forlorn 
encounter nor even an embittered longing. The temple is there as a locus of work, “the 
temple work.” (Note again the refusal of the very possibility of the aesthetic occurring 
through an insistence on the workful nature of the art.) The second occurs more or 
less at the end of the text and underscores the emphatic presence of truth within the 
relation that obtains between earth and world.  
 
Standing there, the temple work opens up a world, while, at the same time 
[zugleich], setting this world back onto the earth which itself first comes forth as 
the homeland. . . . Standing there, the temple first gives to things their look, and 
to men their outlook on themselves. This view remains open as long as [so 
lange als] the work is a work, as long as the god has not fled from it.24 
 
Truly poetic projection is the opening up of that into which Dasein as historical 
is already thrown. This is the earth and, for a historical people, its earth, the 
self-secluding ground on which it rests together with everything that it already 
is, though still hidden from itself. But this is also its world, which exerting 
dominion in virtue of the relation of Dasein to the unconcealment of Being.25  
 
The temple became the setting in which human being—historical Dasein 
(though equally “a people”)—find themselves. One is the other. They come to 
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themselves as they are. Consistent with Heidegger’s own language of return, there is 
an act of recovery. When the temple as a locus of work is set back “on the earth,” the 
process is not a grounding. As Heidegger’s argumentation unfolds, the relation 
between earth and world is renamed as “strife.” While the earth is a ground, it is 
equally “abyssal,” which is to say that it is both Grund and Abgrund. This movement 
is an opening that is also a concealment—which is, equally, the setting of historical 
Dasein itself. The earth as an opening and a closing off is described by Andrew 
Mitchell in his examination of this process as “paradoxical”. Mitchell then goes on to 
provide this setting within an exact formulation: “Paradoxical because this earth 
reveals itself as the sensuous shine of things, a shine that withdraws from all efforts to 
contain it.”26 Appearance is not pure presence. Appearance is located, thus, beyond 
any incorporation into the purely aesthetic. The impossibility of containment and thus 
the earth as a “self-secluding ground” is the presence of the earth as, to employ 
Heidegger’s formulation, “that which both supports and withdraws from the world.”27 
The standing there of the temple is not a mere singularity. Its presence is 
doubled. In opening a world, it places it. The act sets the world into place. The temple 
work opens a place. They occur at the same time. Two acts in the same moment. This 
earth, the site of placing, has a founding designation. First of all it is designated “as 
the homeland.” This coming forth “as” implicates what is at work here in a process of 
production. What is produced is the “earth” as “the homeland.” It is no longer mere 
matter. It is now there as “the homeland.” Place has become historical and, thus, place 
is what it is in its differentiation from matter as mere givenness. Place is no longer to 
be interpreted or understood as that which is given and thus to which the human has a 
relation. Its presence as “homeland” occurs “first,” though it is recovered afterwards. 
What has been produced is itself productive. What is produced is a complex interplay 
of the look and the outlook in which a sense of propriety is found—the finding of that 
which has already been given. Another condition is built into this setting, a condition 
that sustains this productive quality. The condition is announced in the passage by the 
expression “as long as”: while the direct reference is to the work remaining a work, 
what it also indicates, if only implicitly, is that the relation between work and world 
has a circumscribed setting. Hence the question: might it not be possible for a work to 
have an afterlife and thus a sense of work that is not directly explicable in terms of the 
way Heidegger understood work and world? In other words, the question that arose in 
the move from danger to pure danger returns. 
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What will be pursued at this stage, however, is the other temporal marker, 
namely, the formulation “at the same time” (zugleich). It enables the earth/world 
relation to be as it is. It is the moment in which the temple work occurs. A world is 
opened, “at the same time” as “this world” is set “back onto the earth.” While the 
temple no longer works in this way, that marker, as providing the moment in which 
earth and world are brought together in and as the work, must continue to delimit the 
work of the work of art once the latter is taken more generally. This is what it means 
for a work of art to be a work. This is clear from the second passage cited above. 
Poetic projection brings Dasein into earth and world. Dasein is given within this 
setting. Entering it allows Dasein “to stand in relation to what is not man.”28  
The work of art, then, attests to the earth/world relation and the domain 
understood as Dasein’s “homeland” as the place in which there is the possibility of 
the structure of truth becoming apparent. This occurs precisely because the condition 
of its being—revealing and concealing—is also there in the way the work of art opens 
that structure to Dasein. Each element is both the opening up of the other and the 
opening up to each other. Within the realm of possibilities, there is the 
interconnection of truth as delimited by the relation of revealing and concealing and 
the creation of the decision. The decision, here, is linked to the structure of 
authenticity, since the decision is situated in the midst of truth (the latter as both a 
structure and a possibility). What has already been identified as the “destiny” of 
people and, equally, what is also the “destiny” of Dasein, are acted out. This is 
Heidegger’s thinking of the predicament. If there were a threat to Dasein, were Dasein 
to be in danger, it would be because what would have become impossible is both this 
authentic moment and dwelling in the “homeland.” The danger would only pertain to 
Dasein as a locus of authenticity, hence the importance of the distinction between 
mere decisions and “essential decisions.” Dasein must be prepared for its authentic 
encounter with a recast earth/world relation, a relation for which Dasein will have 
always already been prepared. Preparation is for the future understood as a transition 
to “something completely other.” Dasein’s preparation is for a future delimited by the 
structure of authenticity. Dasein has always been prepared for a possibility that is held 
in place and announced by the simultaneity of what occurs at the same time. The 
“temple work” has to be understood as resulting from a sense of at-the-same-
timeness. To be clear, at-the-same-timeness in the passage noted above defines the 
work’s work as that which opens a world and locates it on the earth. They occur at the 
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same time—zugleich. What is produced is the earth and thus the earth/world relation 
as the “homeland.” This is the act of production that is the condition of possibility for 
Dasein’s recovery of its own most possibility. Place, for Heidegger, at least in the 
context of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” is the “homeland.” That place has been 
produced as such. This is the setting that allows preparedness for the future to occur 
while providing it with the conditions of its own understandability. At-the-same-
timeness marks the temporality both of a network of relations as well as a structure in 
which Dasein comes to be what it is. In the language of “The Origin of the Work of 
Art,” the “world” exerts “dominion” “in virtue of the relation of Dasein to the 
unconcealment of Being.” There is, however, an excision. Excised is the possibility 
that the setting within which this occurs is itself in danger. There is no space, no 
setting, within this specific conception of at-the-same-timeness that would allow this 
other danger, namely, pure danger, to be thought. It would be the violence that would 
come from the outside dominating the space of dominion. In other words, it is no 
longer the “threat that has already afflicted man [Mensch] in his essence.”29 The 
possibility of a stand necessitates a move from the essential that is without human 
being to that which is essential for human being. Here, place has to be affirmed. 
However, preparation in the sense that it occurs in the passages noted above—and it is 
preparation that forms and informs both the need for as well as the structure of the 
decision—has become impossible. A fundamental part of the reason why this is the 
case is that now, presently, at-the-same-timeness works differently. Nothing has 
prepared Dasein for the end of the world; another beginning is not the end of the 
world, moreover, more is at work than the exhaustion of metaphysics.  
There is now a different sense of danger, a sense whose hold is not diminished 
by the overcoming of the aesthetic or the affective in the name of another orientation 
whose purpose is given by a specific structure of truth (truth as the revealing and 
concealing of being). Equally, the disavowal of truth is not resolved by an 
understanding of Dasein’s potentiality for being, that is, by the uncovering of that 
which is there authentically for Dasein within a realm of possibility. Again, this is a 
certain structure of the decision. Disavowal is linked to a claim about the relation 
between danger and the future in which the future as a possibility no longer obtains. 
There is, now, the stark presence of what has already been identified as pure danger. 
Hence the recovering of a possibility, were such a formulation even to make sense, 
that is no longer bond up with a “reflection on a beginning.” The latter is a form of 
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thought in which the future is defined in terms of its own affirmation—the occasioned 
and affirmed transition. Such a reflection now has become pointless. Moreover, its 
conditions of possibility would no longer obtain. Now there is the need for a reflection 
on the end of the world, not just an ending without a beginning, but as an ending that 
is not itself a preparation for a beginning—an end that occurs now and which is not 
there as a beginning. This becomes the affirmation of pure danger. What this means is 
that at-the-same-timeness no longer marks that which allows access to the structure of 
authenticity and which is occasioned by its unfolding the structure of truth. What 
pertains now at the same time is the end of the world and its refusal, that refusal is the 
refusal to think the end as the end and thus the refusal to engage in pure danger’s 
affirmation. There is now another space to be thought and therefore another space for 
thought. 
In order to develop what insists within the formulation of thinking the end as the 
end, a turn will be made to Poussin’s Landscape with St. John on Patmos (1640). 
[Figure 1] Here, what is important is the representation in the painting of the end as a 
beginning. It is present in and as an image. In Heidegger’s engagement with Van 
Gogh’s painting, there is the recognition of truth: “In the painting of Van Gogh truth 
happens.”30  This occurs because of the way the shoes are presented. What is there in 
and with the shoes is the revelation of that which is proper to “beings as a whole.” 
There is a showing. Showing as “unconcealing” which is a process there within the 
“counterplay” of world and earth. Given this larger context in which a particular work 
can be positioned in relation to a sense of totality, and given what can be claimed of 
the work, how is Poussin’s landscape to be understood?  
 
3. Poussin’s Landscape with St. John on Patmos 
According to both the Christian Bible (Rev. 1:9) and a number of ancient sources—
principally Eusebius and Orosius—St. John was on Patmos.31 He was there after 
having been banished by the Roman Emperor Domitian. His body therefore was the 
object of a form of persecution. No longer a simple singularity, his body was marked 
in advance by processes that, while not absolute, are integral to the creation of 
identities. Equally, they are processes that would be world-forming. Precisely because 
such a body is marked in advance and thus would be that on which the processes of 
marking have to incorporate an inevitable partiality, the body then acquires a doubled 
presence. It is the site of the processes that are there at the same time. Hence there is 
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another instance of at-the-same-timeness. The body is an after-effect. Moreover, as a 
result of that production, there is a constitutive spacing at the body’s center, a spacing 
that allows the body to act in ways that resist or refuse those marks that create 
identities. Inevitably, therefore, identities have a necessary partiality and thus an 
original irreducible plurality. St. John’s body is both that which has been banished 
and a site of resistance; both obtain in a given now in their necessary irreducibility. 
Not only does this irreducibility define St. John, it also accounts for the saint’s 
capacity to act and thus to decide. St. John’s body is doubled at the origin. 
Ambivalence, therefore, is able to continue. Even though Patmos may have been the 
world in which the banished lived, it is also possible that Patmos functioned as the 
place in which those forces were refused or resisted.32 The significant point is that 
what allows the body to have this founding ambivalence and, as a result, what allows 
that presence to be effective, is that both possibilities, banishment and its resistance, 
pertain at the same time. What this means, of course, is that at-the-same-timeness in 
this context stages a different set of relations than those noted before. Here, it 
engenders a decision jeopardizing the recovery of any type of unity, let alone that 
which could have been named by terms such as “we” or “our.”  
St. John’s body is both that which has been banished as well as a site of 
resistance to that banishment. Here, the banishing carries over into the act of writing. 
Writing within Poussin’s painting is both act and thus also as the creation of text. The 
act of writing is that which resists. At the outset writing, therefore, takes place in 
relation to the ruined temple. While they are presented together within the 
spatiotemporal simultaneity that perspective provides, the order that its provision 
creates is complicated from within by the irreducibility of one to the other.33 Their 
difference and thus the need for thinking their relation is grounded in their 
presentation at the same time. The unifying force of perspective unifies superficially. 
Hence what must be recovered are the tensions and loci of irreducibility that 
perspective allows to be staged. That staging is the occasioning of at-the-same-
timeness. With Poussin’s painting anoriginal irreducibility has precedence over the 
synthesizing effect of perspective. Here is the setting in which St. John is located and 
which locates St. John.  
In Revelation 1:12, John reports that he heard a voice that commanded him “to 
write what you see in a book.” What did John see? In the foreground of Poussin’s 
painting there is a ruined temple and St. John writing. The interplay of writing as an 
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opening to the future, when taken in relation to the presence of the ruined temple, 
means that both occur within the now that their co-presence creates. The ruin has an 
actuality. If its world is over, it is present now both as announcing that end and 
staging the impossibility of effacing the past. There is a possibility and thus the 
intimation of a progression. The ruin signals the past as that which continues—albeit 
ruined—in the present. Hence it lives on. There were never just ruins. The ruin 
introduces a time lag that exerts a defining hold on the structure of the present itself. 
In turning to the painting proper, the two senses of at-the-same-timeness provide the 
opening to the way St. John, temples, and the landscape are themselves present within 
the frame.34 That is, recognizing that an essential part of both is the presence of the 
already noted time lag. The elements—St John’s body, the temples, and the 
landscape—are related while each element is itself the site of an original form of 
relationality. (A relationality that also pertains to the internal relations that comprise 
each of these “events.”) St. John’s body in Poussin’s painting is engaged in a task. 
The body’s presentation is coterminous with that task’s performance. The body’s 
activity occurs in the landscape and yet is apart from it.35 This doubling undoes the 
possibility that this is the presentation of the Stoic conception of apatheia. Despite the 
fact that Poussin’s relation to Stoicism is a continual theme within the reception of his 
work, and while questions of equanimity and the quelling of the passions may have 
informed Poussin’s own self-conception of his work, here a different path will be 
followed. 
Even though all of Landscape with St. John on Patmos continues to warrant a 
careful and detailed analysis, at this stage emphasis is to be given to the complex set 
of relations that exist between the figure of St. John, the presence of architecture, and 
the landscape. The first point that has to be noted concerns the presence of the ruin 
directly in front of the prone figure of St. John. Prior, however, to taking up his 
presence, the question to which the ruin gives rise concerns how its relation to the 
non-ruined temple, located in the middle of the work, is to be understood. Through 
that temple, differing parts of the ancient city can be discerned. To what extent should 
the literal ruin be taken to predominate? What, then, of the relation between these two 
temples? Once these questions are allowed to orientate the ensuing engagement with 
Poussin’s painting, then the general claim has to be that each singular element is an 
after effect of that relation. Relationality prevails once at-the-same-timeness takes 
precedence over the simple simultaneity that perspective affords. While perspective 
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creates a singular time and provides an apparent coherence, that creation and ensuing 
appearance cannot be allowed to suppress the play of different temporal orders and 
complex relations of which the work is comprised. A beginning can be made however 
with the actual ruin.  
The ruin has a number of components that are essential. Its presence indicates 
that a world has been brought to an end.  Evidence for that sense of ending is 
announced by the literal ruin. There has been the ruination of that world. There is a 
fundamental addition, namely, that what has been ruined exists as a ruin in the 
present. The present therefore incorporates the ruin. There is a direct interpretation of 
the ruin that accords both with elements of Christianity and with aspects of Stoic 
physics. In Matthew 19:28, Jesus signals what will occur when he has attained glory. 
A new relation between human being and God will have taken place. This occurrence 
is given a specific designation. It will happen in what is referred to as “in the 
regeneration” or “at the renewal of all things.” The Greek, however, contains an 
explicit reference to the problem posed by the ruin. The Greek text is ἐν τῇ 
παλινγενεσίᾳ.  In other words, the future and thus continuity are generated from 
stones (that is, it is an instance of palingenesis). Hence, the future as locus of 
profound transformation has its genesis in ruins. This conception of generation and 
regeneration, of palingenesis as a creative force, also plays an important role in Stoic 
physics.36 While it is always possible to pursue this aspect of the ruin, here what is 
central is noting the way the time lag introduces a sense of deferral into the 
palingenetic. In other words, rather than regeneration and repetition, what counts here 
is the presence of the active body of St. John and thus the nature of the world in which 
that body acts. He is present within (and before) the ruin. Hence, emphasis is being 
given here to the relation between St. John and the ruin, rather than allowing the 
stones (the literal ruin) to function as an end in itself. Once the time lag is attributed 
interpretive centrality, and that attribution is necessary precisely because of the nature 
of the world that the time lag both opens and sustains, then what becomes important is 
the recognition that the ruin incorporates an essential ambivalence which signals the 
operative presence of another modality of at-the-same-timeness, one that would be 
precluded were the palingenetic the only avenue of interpretation.  
The ambivalence takes the following form. On the one hand, the ruin could be 
viewed nostalgically and thus as a source of hope to the extent that hope was defined 
by its connection to the past. In this instance, hope and melancholia would be 
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interarticulated. On the other hand, the ruin allows for the mark of an end and thus the 
possibility of a radical beginning. The ruin indicates that a threshold condition now 
pertains. And yet, the threshold, in forming part of the present, means that what 
informs the present—informs and forms it—is the now present necessity to engage 
with the actuality of the ruin. If St. John were defined by his place in front of the 
literal ruin without the other temple being brought into consideration, the force of his 
position would be lost.  That force has to be thought within the context created by the 
ruin’s ambivalence. And it is precisely that ambivalence, which is of course a 
modality of at-the-same-timeness, that is reinforced and sustained by the relation to 
the other temple. Allowing for both reinforces the way the time lag is effect. The now 
within which St. John acts has been effected by it. At-the-same-timeness has to prevail 
because it is the ambivalence that both grounds and allows what here would be the 
decision.  
The other temple is not a literal ruin. It is an actual site. Another question comes 
to insist. What occurs once the relation between the sites is accorded centrality? One 
response might be to suggest that whether or not temples or sites are literal ruins or 
still standing, the presence of St. John and the world to which his writings now refer 
means that the world of the temples, ruined and standing, is over. That world has been 
ruined. However, such a response is too hasty. Absent from it is what has already 
been identified as the time lag—that is, the presence of the past in the present as a 
constitutive element of the present. The ruin is part of the present. It announces the 
present as that which occurs, in the now of its occurring, in its differentiation from the 
past, the past now as the world of the ruin. What this means here is that the ruin as the 
past forms part of the present. Before turning to the figure of St. John, it is essential to 
draw a connection between the time lag and the landscape. Landscape is a 
fundamental element of a number of Poussin’s paintings.37 In this instance, there is an 
important connection between Poussin’s use of landscape and Heidegger’s conception 
of the earth. While both eschew any reduction to either nature or mere material 
presence, they hold open different possibilities.  
For Heidegger, earth is that on which human dwelling comes to be what it is. In 
its relation to the world there is a spacing, a clearing, in which “beings can be as 
beings.”38 They take a stand. And yet, as has already been noted, the earth is not the 
physical ground and thus the literal place on which things—temple, ruins, etc.—are 
placed. On the contrary, for Heidegger, “earth occurs essentially as the sheltering 
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agent.”39 The earth, therefore, has a salvific force, which means that the earth opens 
towards the best. (The best is that which can be affirmed in its own right.)  Landscape 
as the earth means that it cannot be equated with the ground but must be that which 
has its own “law.” The importance of art’s work is that it occasions the recovery of 
the determining aspect of the earth. While, for Heidegger, the law of the earth is 
bound up with truth as revealing and concealing, again a setting afforded by the work 
of art in Poussin’s painting, it might be suggested that there is another mode of 
revealing and concealing in play. The stakes are just as high, given that what remains 
in play is an account of historical time. Equally, what counts as the interplay of truth, 
place, and time is also part of the setting. At-the-same-timeness opens that set of 
connections in another way. Just to be clear, at-the-same-timeness involves the 
ambivalence of St. John’s body, thus its presence as a plural event, as well as St. 
John’s relation to the ruin that constructs a present as defined by the presence of the 
past within it. This is the effect of the time lag. Hence there is another instance of at-
the-same-timeness. Events—St. John, the ruins, even the landscape itself—that are 
given within relations have a founding irreducibility. Within the painting, there is an 
important shift in the presentation of time.  The present becomes, as a result, a site 
that is in part configured by a relation of negotiation with an ineliminable past. (A 
past that is now present, continually present in and as the now.) The past is there, 
always there, within and as the present, at the same time. The time lag demands a 
definition of the present in terms of activities delimited by a complex form of 
relationality: the relation with the past in the present. The ruin continues.  
In the argumentation of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the role of the 
structure of truth within Heidegger’s formulation of the earth can be located in the 
constancy of the demanding term “self-secluding.”40 Heidegger writes:  
 
To set forth the earth means to bring it into the open region as the self-
secluding.41  
 
The earth yields an open space that is neither pure giveness, the earth as simply 
posited, nor is there a sense of an open region as pure neutrality (which would be 
found, for example, in the use of terms such as “wilderness”). On the contrary, the 
open region is the locus of the strife of earth and world, while it is, of course, 
constituted by that strife. In its movement, what is allowed to be is also withdrawn. 
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For Heidegger, it is in the withdrawal that there is the refusal that marks the history of 
Dasein’s relation to the history of being. That is its history and thus the structure of its 
historicality. This is the position described in Mindfulness in the following way: 
 
As they sway, their struggle light up—clears—and in the end lighted up—
clear—is the struggle itself as that which refuses itself: the grounding abyss [der 
ab-gründige Grund].42  
 
Refusal becomes the mark of a withdrawal that defines the place of the historical and 
allows for the progression beyond what is there. Moreover, it is in that progression 
that the “we” is constructed and place becomes historical.  
What is occurring in Poussin’s painting, however, cannot be described in the 
same way, and yet the landscape is the open. It is the place of history. The temples 
provide a setting for any thinking of an overcoming. The temples’ register is a 
possibility. Ruination becomes the mark of a possibility. They are there, therefore, as 
a potentiality to be actualized. The ruin indicates that it is possible to move beyond. 
Moreover, this is what the time lag indicates. The presence of the past as ruin or as a 
locus for possible ruination creates a complex present in which there is the continual 
negotiation with the time lag rather than the preparation for a new beginning. The 
possibility of an overcoming is, in the context of Poussin’s painting, the truth of 
history. It is the truth that takes a stand against historicism. However, what has to be 
added here is that such a possibility is not part of the past. On the contrary, it is the 
survival of the past within and as part of the present, hence the figure of St. John.  
St. John writes. In writing, he is creating that which cannot be assimilated either 
to the world that stands or to the world that is there as ruined. As such, St. John writes 
with (and within) another sense of the open. The painting presents a space, namely, 
the spacing between St. John and the ruin. While literal, it should not be literalized. It 
is the space in which in the distancing of the ruin and the writing—a holding together 
which is also a distancing—is then allowed to emerge as the acting out (the enacting 
therefore) of another beginning. This other beginning takes place insofar as both 
elements are copresent in their irreducible difference. At-the-same-timeness is both 
productive and orientated towards the best. The challenge at the present—now—is 
holding to this sense of the productive. What is significant about Poussin’s painting is 
that while it contains a productive sense of at-the-same-timeness, it might be that very 
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aspect that now will have become a setting that yields its own sense of nostalgia. 
Within its actuality, that nostalgia coalesces with a false sense of hope in which what 
may be longed for now is the sense of a beginning. Though not just a sense of a 
beginning, but rather a sense that is already implicit in a version of palingenesis, 
namely, another beginning, a beginning that is wholly other, which means, of course, 
that what is then passed by is the presence of pure danger. The illusion is that danger 
has been averted and that the possibility of the best still endures. This, however, is not 
what pertains now. Now pure danger has to be thought. But, were it to be, what then 
would have to prevail is another sense of at-the-same-timeness. What then is pure 
danger? While it may still be the case that the temporal lag is operative, the ruin—be 
it literal or otherwise—is now no longer a remnant. In Poussin’s painting, the ruin 
remained a locus of negotiation. It was there marking the continual possibility of a 
beginning. Hence at-the same-timeness delimited a locus whose irreducibility 
contained an opening. Now, however, at-the same-timeness has a different quality. 
The best has ceded its place to the worst. While the now both contains and is 
comprised of a fundamental irreducibility in the precise sense that it remains open, 
that sense of the open cannot be thought as a future that allowed for its own 
affirmation. Consequently, preparation has to be understood differently. Now it has 
become impossible to identify a sense of beginning that can be affirmed. The worst no 
longer simply threatens. It has acquired its own reality. Equally, what is absent from 
the setting that holds now is what Heidegger identified as “the power to prepare a 
transition.” If there is “power” now, it has a different quality. Now what insists is a 
coalescence of futurity and danger that yields an opening without any possible 
affirmation. Consequently, there is no longer a “we” that comes to be what it is before 
“another beginning.” This now is the predicament. Moreover, this is pure danger. 
Works of art, art’s work, now have to be different. The project, therefore, is to begin 
to trace the presence of pure danger within the work of art. The argument in the 
following is that it is precisely this sense of danger that can be found in decisive 
elements of Anselm Kiefer’s multimedia installation Walhalla.  
 
4. Anselm Kiefer’s Walhalla: The World at the End of the World 
If, as Heidegger argues, “truth happened” within the painting by Van Gogh, then in 
these works by Kiefer, truth is located in the impossibility of what occurs within 
them. As works of pure danger, they open at the limit of the image. Nothing happens. 
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They are the end. That is their opening. More generally, of course, the work of 
Anselm Kiefer has always involved a continual stand in relation to history and thus by 
extension both to how historical time is to be thought and the place of history, the 
land, is to be understood.43 Kiefer’s work has always evinced a keen understanding 
that history is placed. His work has been informed continually by that project. While 
there has been an attempt to connect his paintings and installations to Heidegger, a 
recent set of works—exhibited under the heading of Walhalla—allow themselves to 
be interpreted in an importantly different way. If Poussin’s Landscape with St. John 
on Patmos can be understood as inscribed within its own sense of earth and world and 
thus the possibility of another beginning, Kiefer’s work can be understood as 
presenting the ruin at (and as) the end of the world. While this is true for a number of 
works within Walhalla, emphasis here will be given to two. The first, named 
Walhalla—though this is a name that has extension to other works—comprises a 
series of steel beds made up with lead sheets and located in a room that is itself lined 
with oxidized lead. [Figure 2] The second is a spiral staircase, approximately twelve 
meters in height and on which paint-spattered clothing, clothing that belonged to both 
adults and children, was hung. The clothing is not simply spattered, more importantly 
it is ruined. This work carries the name of the prayer Sursum corda. [Figure 3] The 
prayer, which is in dialogue form, is placed at the beginning of the Eucharist. It is also 
important to note that the line Sursum corda (Lift up your hearts), from which the 
prayer derives its name, is said by the priest, and the response, Habemus ad 
Dominum, is a reiteration of the act of lifting. What both title and prayer suggest, 
therefore, is an exaltation that while directional leaves the place to which the direction 
points unstated. The prayer might be understood therefore as opening a world. Were 
that to be the case, the question of the quality of that world then returns. Prayer, 
however, invites a return. Prayer, moreover, is always directed. Prayer solicits. If at 
the moment what attends is the worst, then it may be the case that what remains, 
perhaps all that remains, is prayer. While prayer may stand at the end, what is prayed 
for is a beginning. (And that will be the case even if the beginning in question is 
continuity as another beginning.) The question to be addressed concerns the extent to 
which these works by Kiefer are positioned in relation either to a determined sense 
either of an end or to a source of unity.44  
The specific work named Walhalla consists of a series of beds.  They are on 
wheels. They are clearly hospital beds. They are empty. They no longer await. At the 
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end of the room in which the beds are installed, a room that is also part of the 
installation, there is a photo of the artist disappearing. In contradistinction to earlier 
works by Kiefer, in which he has inscribed the productive power of art into the work 
by positioning a hovering or flying palette within it, here art (in the guise of the artist) 
is leaving. Hence there is the now real question of whether art has abandoned the 
scene that it has created. What now can be said of these beds? Here, the insistence of 
the now has to be paramount. The now that works within and sustains Poussin’s 
painting is no longer the now addressed in Kiefer. Hence there are two questions: 
Which now? What now? 
Within the work in question, centrality must be attributed to the impossibility of 
these beds actually awaiting and thus for there to be an awaiting now. Were they to be 
present in a hospital, or in a tent on a battlefield, not only would they await, that 
awaiting could not be separated from their presence within a place of refuge, a place 
providing help and succor and, inevitably, care. However, the bodies have gone, it 
may even be that the war is over. The beds are empty. All that remains are the beds as 
a form of ruin. They have a stark, almost timeless, quality. Each bed is covered with 
sheets. They, too, are made of lead. While as works their reference to death might be 
taken as an opening towards life—turning from death towards the quick—and, thus, 
they may be thought to provide an opening that either begins or inaugurates, the 
contention here is that they do not. This is a position that has to be argued for in terms 
of what an actual opening within the work of art might in fact be. The sense of at-the-
same-timeness at work in Poussin’s Landscape with St. John on Patmos brought the 
possibility of an opening with it. As St. John wrote, he was creating a future; this 
takes place in the now of writing. The impossibility of reducing his body to the 
banished allowed that body to be implicated—as an act of refusal or resistance—in an 
act of writing that was the creation of a beginning. Endings and beginnings were held 
together in their difference at the same time. Here another question emerges: Is there 
something about the ruin in Kiefer that has a temporal singularity? If the answer to 
this question is in the affirmative then it might also be true that what is absent from 
the ruin is a productive sense of at-the-same-timeness. The ruin might be there as 
what might be described as a pure opening. It is this possibility that needs to be 
addressed in relation to both these particular works.  
Walhalla is positioned by a set of empty beds. They have been vacated. 
Emptiness marks the passage from death. Referring back therefore to those who have 
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died while no longer awaiting the living, not even the wounded. The artist’s own 
removal from the scene works to compound the overwhelming sense of loss. 
However, this is no longer the loss that evokes memory. Memory as a project, the 
need to remember at the present, thus, the insistent force of present remembrance, is 
now, while a consideration is no longer the only the only aspect of the work that 
should be taken into consideration.45 An earlier work by Kiefer—Ikarus—märkischer 
Sand (1981)—presents the earth as the place of history. [Figure 4] In that painting, the 
winged palate flying over the work reinforces the claim that the work itself is art’s 
own engagement with the complex interplay of place and history, an interplay that 
lifts the ground from a place in which it is equated with mere materiality and thus 
which allows it to become the place of history and thus the locus of human being as 
being-in-place. The conjecture here is that there is a less positive element in the beds 
that occupy the lead-lined room. A work such as Ikarus—märkischer Sand has an 
almost necessarily affirmative quality in the precise sense that what is affirmed is 
“place” as the locus of history. As a consequence, the sense of history that is then in 
play is linked to contestability and thus to a form of recovery.  Recovery is operative 
in the precise sense that the present is charged with the necessity to remember; 
moreover, that necessity has a defining role within the present. In the case of Ikarus—
märkischer Sand, it pertained in the now in which the work was undertaken. The need 
to remember continues. Adorno’s identification of a specific task in relation to the 
past—Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit (“working through the past”)—that pertains in 
the present still has force, and yet that force has to confront the problem of its own 
relation to thinking the end of the world.46 Indeed, it might be conjectured that, were 
these two works by Kiefer juxtaposed, then what comes to the fore is the productive 
tension between present remembrance, which can incorporate “working through the 
past,” on the one hand, and, on the other, having to work with (and through) the end 
of the world, a working that cannot be separated from a form of affirmation.   
Sursum corda, the work, spirals up. It occupies a single room. The clothes that 
are hung on the spiral staircase are ruined. [Figure 5] And yet, there are questions. 
What, here, is ruined? What does ruination mean?  What remains and, in remaining, 
what present is there now? Unlike the ruins in Poussin’s Landscape with St. John on 
Patmos, which allowed the present to be opened as a locus of negotiation, here the 
ruined clothing eschews any genetic possibility. The clothes are there. They inhabit 
the present, having become the sign of an end without transition. And, as a result, 
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sheltering is no longer an option. How, then, is this predicament without options to be 
understood? To act with options is to act within a structure of the already predicated. 
Acting in this way is to continue towards the catastrophe. Kiefer’s work—the works 
that have already been identified—still acting’s possibility. Or at least they still the 
possibility of taking a stand that points to a redemptive future. This is not to say, 
however, that the works are empty. They appear as the end at the end. These works of 
art clearly stage their affinity with the predicament of philosophy now. They call on 
philosophy, calling for a philosophy of the now. These artworks are engaged with 
what can be presented at the end of the world, namely, pure danger. To begin with a 
negative description, what has to be presented now is the impossibility of any form of 
future that has its possibility in the ending. (And note that what is at stake here is the 
possibility of a “form” that the future might take. This is precisely what is not given.) 
These works—Sursum corda and Walhalla—are constrained by that presentation. 
There is neither exhaustion nor the interplay of endings and beginnings. At the end, 
there is the end. As noted, art’s presentation is what demands to be thought. If the 
demand pertains to an opening that cannot be understood as linked to any form of 
transition, then might not this be the point? Answering this question yields a partial 
conclusion.   
Implicit in what emerges is what can be described as the problem of form. 
While the form of the future is given neither in Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes, nor 
in the interplay of body, ruin, and landscape in Poussin’s paintings, what both works 
provide is the possibility—possibility in the sense of furnishing the philosophical or 
conceptual means—with which to think the future. These possibilities have already 
been given. The future, therefore, becomes a quality of the work. Hence both works 
prefigure that in relation to which forms, albeit different forms, of futurity are to be 
thought. And yet, these works do not prefigure in any straightforward sense. This is 
the possibility that was alluded to before in terms of their identification with a 
temporal singularity. The singular was that which stood, at least at the outset, in 
opposition to at-the-same-timeness. Singularity was mooted as a possibility because 
what now has become difficult is the straightforward project of working through the 
past. The need for memory now brings with it a different set up, namely, working with 
the end of the world. What, however, does it mean to work with the end of the world? 
Part of the answer has already been formulated: to affirm the end of the world. 
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Affirmation here is neither celebration nor the form of resignation that becomes 
radical nihilism. Rather, affirmation delimits another philosophical task.  
The task is linked to understanding in greater detail why, despite the temptation, 
these works by Kiefer do not announce a temporal singularity. There remains the 
question of the end. If the singular were just that, namely, the already discernible end 
point, then thinking the end is to think it in terms of discoverable and identifiable 
points in time, which would mean, in turn, that the end falls within the purview of 
calculation. Working now accepts the calculations that identify the interarticulation of 
climate change and an economic order that sustains injustice; however, what remains 
the locus of activity is what is then opened by that acceptance. Acceptance is the end 
of the world’s affirmation. What is there at the end of the world is its acceptance, the 
acceptance of working with the end of the world. There is a configuration to be 
accepted; however, accepting it is to work with it. Kiefer’s practice as an artist has 
been, to the extent that the preceding argument has any cogency, to work not just at 
the end but with the end. Work becomes a working-with. Furthermore, the inscription 
of a possible future that is already there in the artwork of Poussin, and a strategy of 
thinking that involves a preparation for another beginning which continues within and 
as the philosophical project of Heidegger, have lost their grip on the now. Now, the 
now exerts its hold in a radically different way.   
If there is a conclusion, and the very language of conclusions and summation 
seems otiose at this precise point, then the concession of what amounts, almost, to the 
impossibility of thinking it seems an essential part of its nature. The end of the world 
is the end of its life. There is a philosophical limit. While philosophy may be unable 
able to think that which refuses or is refused survival, what cannot be denied—in the 
end—is the presence of a call on thought and thus of working-with. What is opened 
by this call is the necessity to respond responsibly to the presence of pure danger. 
There is a form of insistence, and so the task at hand involves responding to it and 
thus of working-with it. There can only be a question at the end: What remains? 
 
                                                        
Notes 
1 The use of italics to express the now in its differentiation from a simple now is 
intended to identify a thinking of the present as that which generates the philosophical 
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task. A task that occurs now has been delimited by the now and allows the now both 
to be a site of contestation and be subject to its own forms of transformation. The now 
delimits a task. Indeed, there is reciprocity between what can be described more 
generally as “time” and “task.” I have developed the reciprocity between “time” and 
“task” in “Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the Present,” reprinted 
in Benjamin, Present Hope, 25–53. 
2 I have discussed the concept of the “predicament” in the context of Hannah Arendt’s 
work and then more generally in Benjamin, “The Problem of Authority in Arendt and 
Aristotle” and “The Predicament of Life: Dennis Schmidt and the Ethical Subject.” 
3 IPCC, Climate Change 2014. 
4 See, e.g., Schor, “Climate, Inequality and the Need for Reframing Climate Policy.” 
5 This aspect of Heidegger’s work will be decisive in the argumentation to come, 
which will involve a discussion of this formulation as it appears in his Basic 
Questions of Philosophy. 
6 All further reference to “The Origin of the Work of Art” (OWA) will be to the 
translation by Albert Hofstadter in Heidegger, Basic Writings, 139–212. 
7 In terms of arguments to do with risk, see Bettis, Dietz, and Silver, “The Risk of 
Climate Ruin.” See also Pope Francis, “Laudato Si’,” in which there is also an attempt 
to note the interconnection between injustice and climate change. 
8 In the context of the Phaedo, Plato’s arguments contain their own inbuilt 
complexity. For an overall estimation of two threads of argumentation in the texts that 
pertain to death—one religious and other philosophical—see White, “Socrates, 
Philosophers and Death.” 
9 I have developed the concepts of being-in-place and in being-in-common as 
anoriginal conditions in a number of recent works. See, e.g., Benjamin, Place, 
Commonality and Judgment and Virtue in Being.  
10 An entire discussion of the end of world could be focused on Lars van Trier’s film 
Melancholia (2011). The film has already attracted a significant secondary literature. 
See, in particular, Elsaesser, “Black Suns and a Bright Planet”; O’Brien, “Planetary 
Provocations”; Apter, “Planetary Dysphoria”; Honig, “Public Things.”  
11 There is an important concern with ruins within art history. That history cannot be 
neglected. Indeed, it would be essential to connect that work to the project on the ruin 
 
 29 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
that is being undertaken here. For an important analysis of ruins within Renaissance 
painting, see Hui, “The Birth of Ruins in Quattrocento Adoration Paintings.” If Hui 
were right that the ruin is “metonymically the death of antiquity” and, thus, the use of 
the ruin in nativity paintings announced “the rebirth of antiquity” (p. 347), then a very 
different project is taking place in the presence of ruins in Poussin’s Landscape with 
St. John on Patmos.   
12 Michel Haar has identified at least four different senses of earth in Heidegger’s text. 
His study still remains the definitive work on this topic. See Haar, The Song of the 
Earth. 
13 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 45, 125 (hereafter, GA 45)/Basic Questions of 
Philosophy, 109 (hereafter, BQP). 
14 Ibid. 
15 GA 45, 124/BQP, 108. 
16 Ibid. 
17 GA 45, 125/BQP, 108. Translation modified. 
18 The reference here is, of course, to the opening of Hölderlin’s poem “Patmos,” in 
Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, Briefe und Dokumente, vol. 10.  
 
Nah ist 
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott 
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst 
Das Rettende auch. 
 
Heidegger takes up this poem in his “The Question Concerning Technology.” Charles 
Scott has drawn attention to the fact that das Rettende, in this context, needs to be 
understood as involving the way that things are returned to “their unuseful being.” 
See Scott, On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics, 76.  
19 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 66, 167 (hereafter, GA 66)/Mindfulness, 145 
(hereafter, M).  
20 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5, 35 (hereafter, GA 5)/OWA, 174. 
21 GA 5, 51/OWA, 188. Tr. mod. 
22 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 40, 171/Introduction to Metaphysics, 176. 
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23 GA 5, 59/OWA, 197. 
24 GA 5, 28/OWA, 168. Tr. mod. 
25 GA 5, 63/OWA, 200. Tr. mod. 
26 Mitchell, The Fourfold, 72. 
27 See, in this regard, Davis, “Returning the World to Nature.” Furthermore, Shane 
Mackinlay, in his paper “Heidegger’s Temple,” is also concerned with the interplay of 
truth as revealing and concealing. His position is formulated thus (p. 503): “The 
uncoveredness of truth is always in relation to a still-covered-over.”  
28 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 15, 390/Four Seminars, 75. 
29 Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 32/“The 
Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, 333.  
30 GA 5, 45/OWA, 181. Tr. mod. 
31 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 3.18.1; Orosius, Historiae adversus paganos 7.10. 
32 For a general account of the incorporation of Patmos into Apocalyptic writing, see 
Boxall, Patmos in the Reception History of the Apocalypse. 
33 While it cannot be pursued in detail here, this point is pitched against both a 
naturalization of perspective and its equation with the site of what might be described 
as additive complexity. While his argument is different perspective, it can still be 
suggested that Emmanuel Alloa is correct when he argues that perspective is a 
“principle of formation and deformation in one.” (p. 70) See Alloa, “Could 
Perspective Ever Be a Symbolic Form?” 
34 The connection between Poussin and the engagement of both theoretical and artistic 
time is not arbitrary. The question of time also plays a role in Erwin Panofsky’s 
engagement with Poussin. See Panofsky, “Et in Arcadia ego.” In addition, see Charles 
Dempsey’s discussion of Panofsky in “The Classical Perception of Nature in 
Poussin’s Early Works,” in particular, pp. 245–48. Clearly, what has been added here 
under the heading of at-the-same-timeness is the introduction of another quality of 
time as integral to the way the artwork works as the work of art. 
35 It is that complex setting that would check any claim that what “defines landscape 
painting for Poussin is that the ‘participants’ in the landscape are ‘acted on by 
nature’ ” as has been argued by David Carrier (see Carrier, “Nicolas Poussin’s 
‘Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake’,” 35). Indeed, the argument here is that 
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nature would be an irrelevancy in terms of its exerting an operative force on the St. 
John/ruin relation. 
36 Louis Marin also makes reference to the position of palingenetic concerns within 
this painting; Marin, Sublime Poussin, 149. 
37 For a more detailed art historical account of Poussin on landscape, see Carrier, 
Poussin’s Paints, 145–74. 
38  GA 5, 40/OWA, 178. 
39 GA 5, 28/OWA, 168. 
40 See, in this regard, Dastur, “Heidegger’s Freiburg Version of the Origin of the 
Work of Art,” 138. 
41 GA 5, 33/OWA, 173. See Miguel de Beistegui on this topic: 
 
As self-secluding, self-sheltering matter, the earth opens itself only to those for 
whom reality is composed of more than just presence, and space more than just 
actual physical space. The earth does not belong to us. We belong to it. As we 
try to appropriate it, it withdraws.  
 
Beistegui, The New Heidegger, 149. See, in addition, Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art 
and Art Works, 150. 
42 GA 66, 84/M, 70. 
43 On the question of history in Kiefer, see Stoker, “Can Heaven Bear the Weight of 
History?” In addition, Matthew Biro has made an important case for the significance 
of Kiefer’s engagement with the Holocaust as an event calling on memory. The 
conclusion to his paper warrants careful consideration. See Biro, “Representation and 
Event.”  
44 For example, Wayne Stables argues that “Kiefer’s work demonstrates . . . that it 
remains impossible to think fragmentation without narrative end.” The conjecture 
here is that while that might have been true, the works under consideration operate in 
a fundamentally different way. To the extent that such a claim can be substantiated, 
then, these works by Kiefer are fundamental to any attempt to think an end without a 
beginning and thus to think the end of the world. See Stables, “Anselm Kiefer and the 
Sign of the Sublime,” 12. 
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45 I have taken up this aspect of Kiefer’s work in my “Present Remembrance: Anselm 
Kiefer’s Iconoclastic Controversy,” reprinted in Benjamin, Art, Mimesis and the 
Avant-Garde, 75–84. 
46 Theodor Adorno, “What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?”  
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